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Abstract 
The relationship between institutional fragmentation of urban regions and inequality in 
government service levels is subject to a long-running debate. On the one hand, neo-progressive 
reformers argue that fragmented municipal institutions produce a systematic mismatch between 
fiscal resources and public needs and thereby perpetuate income inequality. On the other hand, 
public choice scholars hold that polycentric government is more responsive to residents’ needs, 
and that issues of income distribution can be addressed by intergovernmental coordination. 
However, the role of this multi-level intergovernmental compound of metropolitan governance in 
tackling territorial inequalities remains unclear. This paper aims to contribute to the further 
development of this debate, by drawing on a comprehensive analysis of social policy efforts at 
the municipal level in the seven largest metropolitan areas in Switzerland. We explore the effect 
of social segregation, municipal resources, residents’ political preferences, as well as 
intergovernmental grants on per capita social expenditures in metropolitan municipalities. The 
results show that, while multi-level intergovernmental cooperation and fiscal equalization 
between rich and poor municipalities do play a moderating role, institutional fragmentation is an 
obstacle to matching fiscal resources with social policy needs. In the fragmented setting of the 
Swiss metropolis, social policies at the municipal level appear as an act of political voluntarism 
by the rich, rather than as a matter of redistribution oriented by principles of social justice. 
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 1 Introduction 1 
The relationship between institutional fragmentation of urban regions and inequality in 
government service levels is subject to a long-running debate. On the one hand, it is argued that 
fragmented governmental settings produce a systematic mismatch between fiscal resources and 
public needs and thereby perpetuate income inequality. On the other hand, polycentric 
government is presented as more responsive to residents’ needs, and it is argued that issues of 
income distribution can be addressed by voluntary inter-municipal agreements. At the heart of the 
debate is the question to understand "the redistributive consequences of fragmented governmental 
structures within metropolitan areas" (Lowery, 1999b: 8).  
This paper aims to contribute to this debate by a comprehensive empirical analysis of the seven 
largest metropolitan areas in Switzerland, studying the relationship between territorial patterns of 
resident wealth on the one hand, and levels of municipal public services on the other hand. 
Focusing particularly on the effect of intergovernmental cooperation in the metropolitan areas 
under scrutiny, we aim to explore the redistributive effects of the multi-level compound of 
governance that often characterises metropolitan areas.   
The analysis is presented in four steps. In the theoretical section, we review and discuss the main 
arguments of the debate on the relationship between institutional fragmentation and social 
inequality and present its major propositions that will be at the core of the empirical enquiry. We 
then briefly expose the data and method used, before presenting the empirical findings. In the 
discussion, we wrap up the findings and discuss their relevance. 
1  This paper is based on research conducted for the project Cleavages, governance and the media in European metropolitan 
areas, financed by the National Centre of Competence in Research Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century at the 
University of Zurich. An earlier version has been presented at the ECPR General Conference in Bordeaux, September 4th to 
7th, 2013, and the authors would like to express their gratitude to participants of this events for insightful feedback.  
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 2.  Sorting and public service in the fragmented metropolis: 
theoretical expectations 
In many countries across the world, urban areas have expanded irrespective of administrative 
boundaries of local government. Institutional fragmentation of metropolitan areas is widespread. 
Obvious drawbacks resulting from this situation have sparked a long-running scientific debate 
about the best way to organize governance in metropolitan areas. This debate has coined three 
intellectual traditions (for an overview see Ostrom, 1972, Lefèvre, 1998, Lowery, 1999a, Kübler, 
2003, Savitch and Vogel, 2009). The first, so-called metropolitan reform tradition, advocates 
institutional consolidation by territorial reforms, arguing that service delivery will be more 
efficient and socially equitable when governmental units are larger. In stark contrast to this, the 
public choice perspective argues that institutional fragmentation of metropolitan areas is 
desirable, as it leads to competition between local governments and thereby to efficient allocation 
of public resources. Public choice scholars hold that area-wide governance will emerge by itself, 
as localities engage in voluntary cooperation and settle conflicts between them in order to realize 
economies of scale. Emphasising the merits of self-governance between autonomous localities, 
the public choice perspective therefore strongly opposes institutional consolidation and 
centralized government as advocated by the metropolitan reformers. For a long time, the debate 
on metropolitan governance has been characterized by a confrontation between these two 
perspectives, leading to a dispute between advocates and opponents of institutional consolidation 
(Lowery, 1999a) via municipal amalgamation, city-county consolidation (in the USA) or the 
setting up of new scales of government at the metropolitan level - so-called metropolitan 
governments. More recently however, a third perspective has emerged, emphasizing the genuine 
role of formal and informal policy- networks in metropolitan governance (Wallis, 1994, Savitch 
and Vogel, 2000, Brenner, 2002). Provisionally labelled new regionalism, this third perspective 
conveys a more relaxed view on the design of institutional territorial institutions in metropolitan 
areas. New routes to regionalism, it is argued, can be diverse (Savitch and Vogel, 2000): they 
may include institutional consolidation, but intergovernmental cooperation between autonomous 
localities, or policy-networks involving non-state actors are considered as functional equivalents, 
as long as they successfully associate those actors that are relevant to policy-making. 
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2.1 The Social Stratification and Government Inequality (SSGI) thesis 
Equity has been at the very heart of the debate on metropolitan governance ever since, and has 
been a matter of intensive dispute between metropolitan reformers and public choice theorists. In 
a nutshell, the dispute is about whether the fragmentation of metropolitan areas into a large 
number of autonomous jurisdictions perpetuates and reinforces social inequalities - as the 
metropolitan reformers claim - or whether it does not - as the public choice theorists argue.  
The metropolitan reform position has been elaborated in what is known as the Social 
Stratification and Government Inequality (SSGI) thesis. It was originally developed by Hill 
(1974) and Neiman (1976) on the basis of evidence showing that social inequality in US 
metropolitan areas is strongly associated with the degree of governmental fragmentation. They 
argue that a fragmented governmental setting, against the background of residential sorting and 
social segregation, leads to a situation where poor municipalities lack the public resources 
necessary to address their residents' needs. In addition, the small size of jurisdictions in 
fragmented settings enables concentrations of wealthy residents to influence municipal policies 
so as to reduce redistribution and keep taxes low. The result is a systematic mismatch between 
resources and needs, whereby income inequalities are perpetuated and even reinforced. In an 
article published in the early 1980s, Elinor Ostrom (1983) provides a compelling synthesis of the 
SSGI thesis as a set of eight propositions (see Box): 
Box 1: Eight propositions derived from the SSGI thesis 
P1: Families with similar resources, beliefs and habits regarding living patterns will tend to seek residences near 
one another. 
P2: Residents tend to use municipal powers, such as zoning and other land use controls, to enhance the relative 
fiscal position of the jurisdiction in which they live and the social homogeneity of the neighbourhood in 
which they live. 
P3: Suburban municipalities are consequently divided into many relatively homogenous communities of the poor, 
the middle class, and the wealthy. 
P4: The larger the number of the municipal governments in the metropolitan community, the greater the 
inequality in the distribution of fiscal and other resources among them. 
P5: 'The higher the social status of a jurisdiction, the greater the level of resources available to support public 
services' (Neiman, 1982: 221). 
P6: The higher the level of public resources allocated to a service, the higher the level of services received by a 
population living in a jurisdiction. 
P7: Central cities tend to allocate services in favour of the poor. 
 Thus 
P8:  'Municipal government becomes an institutional arrangement for promoting and protecting the unequal 
distribution of scarce resources' (Hill 1974: 1559).  
Quoted from Ostrom (1983: 94-95) 
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Numerous empirical investigations on metropolitan social segregation, mainly in the US, rest 
upon the SSGI thesis. A drastic illustration is the American Apartheid argument made by Massey 
(1993), according to which the governmental fragmentation of the US metropolis has perpetuated 
and reinforced racial segregation and poverty among African-Americans. In a similar vein but 
more subtly, Downs (1994) has pointed out the mechanisms of exclusionary zoning, by which 
small-sized and wealthy jurisdictions use their autonomy to restrict housing choices for 
disadvantaged groups and ensure that the rich can stay among themselves (Downs, 1994). And, 
based on a transaction cost model, Lowery (2000) has shown that governmental fragmentation of 
the US metropolis enables the rich to sort into wealthy municipalities thanks to the reduction of 
information costs in residential choices.  
2.2 Debating the SSGI thesis 
Elinor Ostrom, in her article, not only provides an overview of the main propositions forming the 
SSGI thesis, but mainly aims at formulating a consistent public choice critique (Ostrom, 1983). 
For a start, she argues that there is enough evidence to accept P1 (residential sorting according to 
social status and lifestyles) , as well as P2 (residents' preferences shape municipal policies) as 
plausible. But the remaining propositions, she argues, are highly questionable. Empirical 
evidence in support of  P3 (emergence of distinct and homogenous wealthy,  middle class and 
poor suburbs) is scarce; examinations of P4 (governmental fragmentation reinforces fiscal 
imbalances) generally suffer methodological shortcomings;  evidence regarding P5 (wealthy 
jurisdictions will spend more on public services) suggests that the effects of social status on local 
expenditures are complex, due to the multi-level character of metropolitan governance that 
influences or compensates local choices;  P6 (high expenditures means high levels of service) 
downplays differences in service efficiency across municipalities; P7 (central cities are more 
attentive to the needs of the poor) ignores that smaller bureaucratic units can be more responsive 
to residents than larger ones. Finally, given the shaky empirical or theoretical basis of the 
previous propositions on which it is based, Ostrom concludes that P8 is unwarranted and must be 
refuted.  
In her argumentation against the SSGI thesis, Ostrom points out that much of the existing 
research on the relationship between governmental fragmentation and social inequality in 
metropolitan settings does not pay sufficient attention to the multi-level character of metropolitan 
governance. The main problem of existing SSGI research, she argues, is that it suffers from a 
problem of scope: “The SSGI assertion that fragmentation is the cause of inequity in service 
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delivery ignores the role of overlapping governmental units in redistributing resources at county, 
state, and federal levels to municipalities with a poor resource base. … To understand distribution 
patterns in metropolitan areas, one must examine the compound system and not just one 
horizontal layer” (Ostrom, 1983: 93). 
Reacting to Ostrom's critique from a neoprogressive (i.e. renewed metropolitan reform) 
perspective, Lowery (1999b) takes the debate a step further. On the one hand, he argues that new 
empirical evidence in fact buttresses the SSGI thesis assumptions on residential sorting and 
segregation in the US metropolitan areas (P1 to P4). There is now a more fine-grained 
understanding on segregation as an effect of sorting rather than exclusion, i.e. pull factors (e.g. 
municipal tax-service packages) are more important for residential choices than push factors (e.g. 
housing, job opportunities, family reasons). In the US, these pull factors continue to make race 
the most powerful aspect of social sorting in the housing market, and Lowery quotes evidence 
showing that P3 is indeed plausible: income sorting and racial segregation by jurisdiction has 
increased in US metropolitan areas since the 1990s, with the obvious effect on municipal tax-
bases. Regarding spending choices of municipalities (P5 and P6), Lowery quotes evidence from 
the US to show that Tiebout competition between municipalities in governmentally fragmented 
metro areas is indeed associated with low spending and low taxes, rather than more services for 
the poor.  
On the other hand, Lowery takes a strong stance against Ostrom's rebuttal argument that 
intergovernmental coordination shapes distribution patterns in metropolitan areas. He agrees with 
Ostrom that it is theoretically plausible to assume a role for higher level governments or 
voluntary intermunicipal agreements: State governments could indeed decide and enforce 
redistributive policies, or municipalities could indeed agree on a plan to share their tax-base. But 
he argues that, at least in the US, this is simply not going to happen: “As a realistic prescription 
of a practical solution to the problems raised by the SSGI thesis, it leaves much to be desired. 
[…] Still, redistribution by higher levels of government is an attractive solution to the SSGI 
problem. So too is the Independence Day notion that an invasion from outer space will erase 
ancient racial, ethnic, and class divisions as we discover shared interests in a common struggle to 
kill aliens. It remains unclear which will occur first” (Lowery, 1999b: 16). In other words: as 
long as the multi-level compound of metropolitan governance does not engage in redistribution, 
the SSGI thesis is still valid. And, Lowery argues, there is reason for pessimism in this respect, as 
the new regionalist tenet of area-wide governance via heterarchical policy-networks makes 
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redistribution unlikely. Given the fact that these policy-networks are consensus based, they are 
unsuitable for redistribution: “Any one city government can veto redistribution among the 
separate governments found within a metropolitan area” (Lowery, 1999b: 16). It follows from 
this that the contribution of new regionalist approaches to improve metropolitan governance is 
limited to Pareto-efficient policies, i.e. those that entail services producing a collective benefit. 
Examples would be transport, economic development, or amenities such as theatres, operas, 
concert halls. However, new regionalist approaches will be inherently unsuitable for zero-sum 
games such as redistribution - where you take from some to give to others.  
2.3 The intergovernmental aspect of metropolitan policy-making  
The intergovernmental sphere has thus moved to the core of the debate on the SSGI thesis. 
Advocates of the SSGI thesis argue that intergovernmentalism is mainly geared towards pareto-
efficiency and therefore unlikely to break the vicious circle of territorial inequalities in 
fragmented metropolitan settings. But critics hold that this is essentially an empirical question 
which remains to be assessed.  
Based on the fiscal federalism literature (see Oates, 1999), we can argue that the potential 
contribution of intergovernmental arrangements to reducing the mismatch between resources and 
needs in institutionally fragmented metropolitan areas resides in two of its features: cooperation 
and equalization. Put broadly, fiscal federalism addresses, both in normative and positive terms, 
the vertical structure of the public sector. Fiscal federalists generally agree that policies of income 
redistribution should be centralized, as the mobility of economic units can seriously undermine 
attempts of local governments to engage in redistributive policies. As Oates nicely put it: “An 
aggressive local program for the support of low-income households, for example, is likely to 
induce an influx of the poor and encourage an exodus of those with higher income who must bear 
the tax burden” (Oates, 1999: 1121). So far, fiscal federalists are very much in line with the SSGI 
thesis. However, fiscal federalists allow for a more differentiated picture as they are not only 
interested in the roles of different levels of government, but also in the ways in which they relate 
to each other, as well as in the differences that these intergovernmental relations make for the 
provision of public goods.  
More precisely, fiscal federalists conceive the relations between jurisdictions - both horizontally 
and vertically - in terms of intergovernmental grants. These are transfer payments through which 
funds can be allocated among different jurisdictions and which, for governments at all state 
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levels, constitute an important additional source of revenues besides tax and debt. 
Intergovernmental grants come in two general forms. First, conditional grants are transfer 
payments whose use by the recipient is restricted - e.g. in the form of matching grants for the 
funding of a given set of services - and can be seen to serve the internalization of spillovers 
between different jurisdictions. They are based on agreements between the involved jurisdictions 
(e.g. what kind of services are provided, by whom, and how the expenditures are covered and by 
whom) and therefore entail active cooperation between them. In fragmented metropolitan 
settings, such cooperation is widespread, as it also serves the interests of localities allowing them 
to incorporate spillovers and to realize scale economies in the provision of costly services 
(Feiock, 2007). Second, unconditional grants are lump-sum transfers that the recipient 
jurisdictions can use in any way they wish. They usually serve the purpose of fiscal equalization 
and are therefore “based on a formula that measures ‘fiscal need’ and ‘fiscal capacity’ of each 
province, state, or locality” resulting in a “disproportionate share of the transfers going to those 
jurisdictions with the greatest fiscal needs and the least fiscal capacity” (Oates, 1999: 1127). 
Policy-instruments based on this idea of unconditional grants for the purpose of fiscal 
equalization play a major role in many countries. They are generally justified on equity grounds 
and are seen to help “create a more level playing field for interjurisdictional competition” (Oates, 
1999: 1128). On the whole, intergovernmental grants resulting from cooperation or fiscal 
equalization between localities can thereby reduce the systematic mismatch between resources 
and needs in institutionally fragmented metropolitan areas - criticized by advocates of the SSGI 
thesis.  
But why should a fragmented setting with strong intergovernmentalism be preferred over 
centralization of policy-making in institutionally consolidated metropolitan areas? The argument 
put forward in this respect by fiscal federalists, particularly in more recent work, is 
accountability. In democratic processes, the weight of each individual citizen is inversely 
proportionate to the number of citizens living in a given jurisdiction. In smaller jurisdictions, 
elected decision-makers can be expected to be more responsive to citizens, and policy outcomes 
will match preferences better. “Centralization allows a greater coordination of policies (i.e. the 
internalization of interjurisdictional externalities), but decentralized decision-making promotes 
accountability” writes Wallace Oates (2005: 358), and explains that fiscal federalists prefer 
decentralization “even if there are homogenous tastes across localities, inasmuch as it enhances 
local control” (2005: 358). 
9 
2.4 Exploring the SSGI thesis in the Swiss context 
Proponents of the SSGI thesis have pointed to the unlikeliness that equity issues in metropolitan 
areas can be addressed otherwise than by institutional consolidation and centralization of policy-
making at the metropolitan level (Lowery, 1999b). However, as pointed out by Elinor Ostrom 
more than thirty years ago (Ostrom, 1983), knowledge about the redistributive effects of the 
multi-level intergovernmental compound of metropolitan governance is still scarce. 
Intergovernmentalism might be an effective way to address problems of equity in fragmented 
metropolitan settings. The extent to which this is the case and the conditions under which this 
happens, however, still remain to be identified.  
In this respect, it is striking to note that political science research on the SSGI thesis seems to 
have been limited to the US context. It is thus unclear to what extent the propositions and 
findings can be generalized, particularly when we want to better understand the redistributive 
effects of arrangements of multi-level governance, and the conditions under which such effects 
occur. While intergovernmental cooperation between localities is widespread in US metropolitan 
areas, the underlying rationale is mainly pareto-efficiency and not redistribution (see Post, 2002, 
Feiock, 2007). A recent overview of governance and finance of metropolitan areas in the US 
(Vogel and Imbroscio, 2013) indeed shows that the so-called special districts - the main bodies of 
intergovernmental cooperation in the US metropolitan areas - are mostly limited to providing 
regional infrastructure, services or public goods but not involve redistribution (except maybe for 
school districts to some extent). Similarly, while intergovernmental transfers do play a role 
within the US states, most of these payments are conditional to use in the context of state policy 
programmes rather than a form of revenue sharing. The study by Vogel and Imbroscio nicely 
shows that, while local governments in US metropolitan areas spend significant shares of their 
budget on social policies (mainly health and welfare), they are heavily dependent on own-source 
revenues, i.e. taxes, property taxes, user fees etc.  
In this light, the US context hence does not appear as the best place to study the role of 
intergovernmental arrangements to tackle equity issues at the metropolitan level. It is therefore 
high time for an exploration of the SSGI thesis in a context outside the US. This is the goal of 
this paper, in which we explore, in the Swiss context, the relationship between territorial patterns 
of resident wealth on the one hand, and the level of social expenditures in municipalities on the 
other hand, while accounting for the effects of intergovernmental arrangements in allocating 
funds to municipalities in the light of their fiscal capacities and needs. As we will see, the seven 
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Swiss metropolitan areas under scrutiny provide a context characterised not only by high 
institutional fragmentation, but also by significant intergovernmental cooperation and fiscal 
equalization which - to the difference of the US context - is a core feature of Swiss federalism 
that has been further intensified in the last decade (see Koch and Kübler, 2011).  
The analysis seeks to answer the core questions in the dispute over the SSGI thesis, which we 
identified as (a) whether there is a systematic mismatch between fiscal resources and social needs 
across metropolitan localities, and (b) to what extent intergovernmental grants resulting from 
intergovernmental cooperation or fiscal equalization is able to reduce this mismatch. This entails, 
first, a descriptive account on residential sorting and segregation in Swiss metropolitan areas, as 
well as on the structure of local public finance and the role of intergovernmental grants therein. In 
a second step, we use multivariate regression analysis to identify the factors associated with the 
level of social expenditures in metropolitan municipalities, which we take as a proxy for 
municipal engagement in redistributive policies. More precisely, three hypotheses flowing from 
the debate on the SSGI thesis will be tested. These are:  
• the ‘public finance’ hypothesis explains municipal engagement in redistributive policies 
as a function of municipal fiscal resources. Proponents of the SSGI thesis indeed argue 
that the social status of a municipality and the resulting availability of resources - 
particularly through self-generated revenues - are the critical determinants for municipal 
support of public services, and thus also for municipal engagement in redistributive 
policies (proposition P5). On the other hand, we have seen that fiscal federalists would 
refute this hypothesis as too simplistic, and emphasise the role that intergovernmental 
grants play in redistributing resources through interjurisdictional cooperation and 
equalization. They would thus expect intergovernmental grants to play a crucial role in 
determining municipal engagement in redistributive policies. 
• the ‘social needs’ hypothesis explains municipal engagement in redistributive policies as 
a function of social needs. Proponents of the SSGI thesis would expect to falsify this 
hypothesis, on the grounds of the argument that, in fragmented metropolitan settings, it is 
the availability of resources in a municipality but not social needs that determine 
municipal engagement in redistribution (proposition P8). To the contrary, critics of the 
SSGI thesis would expect that municipal policies are sensitive to social needs, as 
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decentralised decision-making in a fragmented metropolitan setting ensures local 
accountability of policy choices.  
• the ‘political preference’ hypothesis, finally, focuses on the relationship between a 
municipality’s engagement in redistributive policies and the municipal electorate’s 
political preferences. With respect to this hypothesis, the expectations of proponents of 
the SSGI thesis are unclear. As they tend to celebrate centralized decision-making over 
preference matching in autonomous localities, the question of how policy choices in the 
latter context do or do not match citizens’ preferences is of secondary importance to 
them. To fiscal federalists, on the other hand, the relationship between citizen preferences 
and local policy choices is of crucial importance. It is, in fact, their core argument of 
preferring decentralized decision-making over centralization. On these grounds, fiscal 
federalists would thus expect a strong relationship between electoral preferences and 
municipal policies: the more a municipal electorate leans towards the left, the stronger 
this municipality’s engagement in redistributive policies.  
These three hypotheses focus on independent variables as they flow from different arguments in 
the debate on the SSGI thesis. For the sake of theoretical clarity, it may make sense to look at 
these arguments in an isolated way. In the empirical reality, however, we need to acknowledge 
that there is a relationship between them. For instance, it is plausible to expect that both social 
needs, and financial resources play a role in determining municipal redistributive policies. 
Similarly, political preferences might be a variable that mediates between the role that the 
availability of resources plays in devising social policies. Hence, in order to test the relative 
importance of these different arguments, we will also estimate a regression model that combines 
the variables based on all three hypotheses.  
3. Data and method  
The analysis in this paper implements a cross sectional research design focusing on 456 
municipalities located within the seven major Swiss metropolitan areas. We examine variations 
across these municipalities, cooperation between them, as well as their relationships with the next 
higher level government: the cantons.  
The analysis uses data compiled from three different official sources. First, data on the territorial 
extension and the institutional structure of metropolitan areas, as well as municipal-level 
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aggregates of socio-demographics, geographical characteristics and election results was drawn 
from the website of the Swiss Statistical Office (SSO). Second, the core figures of Swiss public 
finance at the federal and the cantonal level stem from documents published by the Federal 
Finance Administration (FFA), the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), as well as the 
Federal Tax Administration (FTA). The FTA's website also provided municipal level aggregates 
of data on residents' taxable income, on income distribution within municipalities, as well as on 
the overall revenues from federal income tax. Third, public finance data of the 456 municipalities 
located within the metropolitan areas under scrutiny was collected from statistical offices and 
financial oversight authorities of the cantons to which these municipalities belong. Thanks to 
generous help of contact persons within these various organisations, data collection was largely 
unproblematic - as is testified by the low number of cases with missing values on some variables 
(a maximum of 19 out of 456) (see Table 9 in the methodological appendix).  
While the collection of data was quite straightforward, the operationalization of the variables 
proved to be a more challenging endeavour, especially for variables relating to municipal public 
finance. Efforts to standardise public sector accounting in the whole of Switzerland date back to 
the early 1980s, and have recently (in 2008) been strengthened with the publication of new 
guidelines (Harmonisiertes Rechnungslegungsmodell für die Kantone und Gemeinden) based on 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards.2 However, even though most of the twenty-six 
cantons and the municipalities within them now present their accounts according to common 
principles, some differences across cantons, and sometimes even differences across 
municipalities within cantons remain. In order to ensure the commensurability of municipal 
public finance data for the subsequent analysis, some reclassification and recoding of the data 
was necessary (see Table 9 in the methodological appendix).  
On the one hand, municipal budgets had to be carefully checked to ensure consistent 
classification of expenditure data. With respect to calculating total municipal expenditures, a 
difficulty was that there are large differences across municipalities with respect to how they 
organise public schools and their budgets: in some municipalities, expenditures for schools would 
be included in the municipal budget, while others have an independent school district with its 
own budget.3 We therefore chose to exclude education from the municipal expenditure total 
2  See: www.ifac.org 
3  For example: in the canton Zurich, the school budget is accounted for differently across municipalities. Whereas some 
communes have a school budget, education is excluded into specialised entities, the Schulgemeinden (school communities), in 
other municipalities. 
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altogether. For municipal social expenditures - the main variable of interest in this paper - only 
the budget category ‘social security’ (Soziale Sicherheit) was used. According to the budgeting 
guidelines published by the Swiss Public Sector Reporting Advisory Committee4 this category 
contains expenditures for a broad range of instruments in the field of social policy. While some of 
these instruments are imposed to municipalities by higher state levels (mostly the cantons), there 
is still a significant number of instruments where municipal discretion is high. These notably 
include social welfare (Sozialhilfe), day care, housing subsidies, as well as integration 
programmes for foreigners.  
On the other hand, particular care was given to the measurement of transfer payments in the 
public finances of a municipality - not only because transfer payments are a core aspect in this 
paper, but also because the precise labelling of transfer payments in the municipal accounts was 
found to vary considerably. More precisely, transfer expenditures were operationalized as the 
sum of expenditure entries labelled as 'compensation of other jurisdictions' (Entschädigungen an 
Gemeinwesen) or 'contributions' (Eigene Beiträge) to municipalities, the canton, the federation or 
intermunicipal cooperation schemes. Transfer revenues were operationalized as the sum of 
revenue entries labelled as 'refunds from other jurisdictions'  (Rückerstatttungen von 
Gemeinwesen) and 'contributions' (Beiträge für eigene Rechnung) from municipalities, the 
canton, the federation or intermunicipal cooperation schemes. This is a rather conservative 
operationalization of transfer payments - both for expenditures and revenues - as transfers might 
also be hiding in other parts of the municipal account. Moreover, this operationalization does not 
allow, for the time being, to distinguish between vertical transfers (i.e. between a municipality 
and higher levels of government) and horizontal transfers (i.e. between municipalities).  
4. Empirical findings  
4.1 Metropolitan areas in Switzerland: extension and institutional structure 
During the 20th century, Switzerland has been profoundly transformed by a still ongoing process 
of metropolitanization. This process has revealed a metamorphosis of relevant elements of urban 
centrality (see Bassand, 2005). Externally, metropolitanization involves the connection of urban 
societies to a global order of urban networks. Internally, it has led to a recomposition of the urban 
space, in the sense that metropolitan areas5 are nowadays the dominant form of human settlement 
4  See: www.srs-cspcp.ch - > Handbuch HRM2 
5  The notion of metropolitan area originates in the US Census Bureau’s terminology used to define areas of functionally 
integrated urban settlements spread over different administrative boundaries. The official nomenclature of territorial statistics 
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in Switzerland. These metropolitan areas are increasingly functionally integrated, mainly thanks 
to the development of high capacity transport infrastructure. Spatial mobility of goods and 
persons allows an increasing functional specialization of soil, leading not only to accelerated 
urban sprawl and further expansion of metropolitan areas, but in the same time to social 
segregation within them.  
Among the fifty functional metropolitan areas delimited in the latest available official definition 
(Schuler et al., 2005b), seven have a population close to or more than 200’000 inhabitants and are 
included in the subsequent analysis: the metropolitan areas of Zurich, Basle, Geneva, Berne, 
Lausanne, Lucerne and Lugano (Table 1). Taken together, they cover the territory of 456 
municipalities6 and total roughly three million inhabitants, thereby representing about sixty 
percent of the country's urban population.  
Table 1: Demographic and institutional structure of seven major Swiss metropolitan areas 2010 
Metropolitan 
area Overall population 
Overall number of 
municipalities 
Municipalities per 
10‘000 inh. 
Index of 
geopolitical 
fragmentation 
Zurich 1,185,214 131 1.1 3.5 
Basle* 501,285 74 1.5 4.4 
Geneva* 527,764 74 1.4 4.0 
Berne 352,470 42 1.2 3.4 
Lausanne 334,908 69 2.1 5.4 
Lucerne 209,224 16 0.8 2.1 
Lugano* 140,629 50 3.6 8.9 
*excluding municipalities located in neighbouring countries of cross-border metropolitan areas  
Source: Swiss Statistical Office, population census data 
 
 
 
In contrast to most countries of Northern Europe, the local government structure in Switzerland 
has not been subject to comprehensive territorial reforms in the 20th century. Municipal 
amalgamations have taken place incrementally and sporadically. As a consequence, 
municipalities are small and suburbanization is high; in a typical Swiss metropolitan area, 
roughly two thirds of the overall population lives in suburbs outside the core city. This is 
reflected in the index of geopolitical fragmentation (Zeigler and Brunn, 1980) of Swiss 
metropolitan areas (Table 1). In international comparison, geopolitical fragmentation of Swiss 
used by the Swiss Statistical Office uses the term of agglomerations (in German: Agglomerationen; in French: 
agglomérations; in Italian: agglomerati). Commuter patterns are the core criterion used for their operational measurement 
(Schuler, 1984). Conceptually, the Swiss agglomerations are thus equivalent to the US Metropolitan Areas (Schuler, 1999: 
334-340). Throughout this text, we will use the term 'metropolitan areas' as a synonym of agglomerations.  
6  This number does not include the municipalities of international metropolitan areas (Basle, Geneva and Lugano) located 
outside of Switzerland.  
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metropolitan areas is among the highest in the developed world (overall index value 7.3) and, in 
that, comparable to the institutional structure found in metropolitan areas of the United States  
which is highly fragmented as well (overall index value: 7.1) (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers, 
2005). 
4.2 Territorial patterns of social disparities in the Swiss metropolis 
Residential segregation across municipalities within Swiss metropolitan areas has increased 
towards the end of the 20th century (Huissoud et al., 1999), not only with respect to social status 
(i.e. mainly income), but increasingly with respect to choices of lifestyle (Hermann et al., 2005). 
Patterns of residential segregation in Swiss metropolitan areas do not simply set off the core 
cities from the suburbs, but social disparities also exist across the suburbs. These patterns are 
captured by the typology of Swiss municipalities used by the Statistical Office (Joye et al., 1988, 
Schuler et al., 2005a), that distinguishes four types of municipalities within Swiss metropolitan 
areas:  core cities, inner suburbs, affluent suburbs and periurban suburbs. 7  These municipalities 
are distinct not only with respect to their geographical characteristics and location within the 
metropolitan areas, but also in terms of social status of their residents. For the seven metropolitan 
areas under scrutiny here, this is nicely shown in Table 2:  
- Core cities are large and have a socially heterogeneous population, with very high 
proportions of immigrants. The unemployment rate is high and resident's wealth is low.  
- Municipalities in the inner suburban belt are smaller than core cities, but still relatively 
large. The share of immigrants is above average, as is the unemployment rate. Resident 
wealth is below average - these clearly are the poor suburbs of Swiss metropolitan areas.  
- Affluent suburbs are distinctive for their very high level of resident wealth, epitomized by 
the high average taxable income. Proportions of immigrants are relatively high. But to the 
difference of the other suburbs, these are mostly high skilled migrants.  
- Periurban suburbs are located at the outskirts of the metropolitan areas. They are rather 
small in terms of population and density is low. The share of recently constructed, single 
family housing is high. The proportion of immigrants is very low and resident wealth is 
average.  
7  The original denomination of these types of municipalities are centres (core city), communes suburbaines (inner suburbs), 
communes riches (affluent suburbs), communes périurbaines (periurban suburbs).  
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Table 2: Social disparities within the seven major Swiss metropolitan areas; in 2006/10 
  Core cities 
Inner 
suburbs 
Affluent 
suburbs 
Periurban 
suburbs Overall 
Overall number of 
municipalities 2010 7 175 71 203 456 
Population 2010 (mean) 158,624 8,280 4,432 1,859 7,130 
Foreign born 2010 (%) 40.1 29.2 32.6 19.9 25.8 
Unemployment 2010 (%) 3.3 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.2 
Median taxable income 2006 
(in CHF) 51,086 56,947 76,244 61,580 61,935 
Mean taxable income 2006 
(in CHF) 68,138 73,226 136,639 80,799 86,421 
Municipal gini coefficient of 
taxable income 2006 (mean) 0.393 0.358 0.520 0.368 0.388 
Source: Swiss Federal Tax Administration, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs  
With respect to the distribution of income within these municipalities, the figures in Table 2 show 
a number of interesting aspects. For all the four types of municipalities, the mean income is 
clearly above the median income, indicating that the number of taxpayers with very high income 
is rather small. This is also suggested by the average municipal Gini coefficients8 for income in 
the four types. Interestingly, the Gini coefficient is clearly highest in affluent suburbs, suggesting 
that the range between high and low incomes within this type of municipalities is high. No 
differences can be observed between the other three types: the Gini coefficient is slightly higher 
in core cities than in inner and periurban suburbs.  
Figure 1 allows a closer look at the distribution of income within the municipalities. It shows a 
close to linear relation between mean taxable income and the Gini-coefficients for taxable income 
at the municipal level. The heterogeneity of wealth thus increases with higher average income. 
(NB: the values of the Gini-coefficient for taxable income at the municipal level is not 
significantly correlated [p>0.05] with the number of taxpayers living in that municipality. Hence, 
we can exclude statistical effects of municipality size on income heterogeneity therein.) Whereas 
there are several rather poor municipalities with a rather homogenous population regarding the 
distribution of income, there is no affluent municipality with a homogeneously wealthy 
8  This Gini coefficient theoretically ranges from 0 (all residents of a municipality have the same taxable income) to 1 (all 
taxable income in a municipality is earned by one resident, while all the others earn nothing) and can thus be used as indicator 
for homogeneity (low values) - or heterogeneity (high values) - of income.  
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population. Rather, the data suggest that in these municipalities, the high income average is due 
to the presence of some very rich taxpayers, while less wealthy residents continue to live there. 
Nevertheless, poor municipalities tend to be more homogenous, as is shown by the clustering of a 
large number of municipalities in the lower left quadrant of Figure 1. In other words: poor 
municipalities are rather homogenous but affluent suburbs are not. Affluent municipalities 
according to the typology of the Federal Statistical Office are defined as communes with high per 
capita revenues from federal income tax, but this does not mean that the corresponding 
population is a homogeneously wealthy one. In this sense, 'affluent suburbs' appear to be 
misnamed: a more adequate label would be 'suburbs with some very affluent taxpayers'.  
Figure 1: Distribution of residents' taxable income in municipalities of seven Swiss metropolitan areas (data 
for 2006) 
 
Source: Federal Tax Administration 
 
While we can thus distinguish clear territorial patterns of poverty and wealth within Swiss 
metropolitan areas, it must be emphasised that the spatial pattern of social hardship and economic 
wealth markedly differs between the seven metropolitan areas under scrutiny. This is shown by 
the metro level Gini coefficients measuring the distribution of unemployment (as an indicator for 
social hardship), as well as the distribution of federal income tax revenue (as an indicator for 
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wealth) across the municipalities within the different metropolitan areas (Table 3).9 First of all, 
the coefficients suggest that inequalities of affluence are more pronounced than inequalities of 
social hardship. Indeed, in all seven metropolitan areas the distribution of unemployment across 
municipalities is more equal than the distribution of income tax revenues. Unemployment is 
distributed most equally in Basle, followed by Geneva and Zurich, and more unequally than 
average in Bern, Lucerne, Lugano and Lausanne. Differences in the spatial distribution of wealth 
are more substantial. Inequality of wealth between municipalities is most unequal in the 
metropolitan area of Zurich, followed by Lucerne, Geneva and Lausanne. It is less unequal than 
average in the metropolitan areas of Lugano, Basel and Berne. Prima facie, however, 
distributions of poverty and wealth across municipalities do not appear to be linked to the 
institutional structure of the metropolitan areas. Neither of the two metro level Gini coefficients is 
significantly correlated to the index of geopolitical fragmentation.  
Table 3: Distribution of poverty and wealth in the seven major metropolitan areas 
Metropolitan 
area 
weighted Gini coeffcient of 
unemployment 2010 
weighted Gini coefficient of 
per capita federal tax 
revenues 2008 
Zurich 0.129 0.362 
Basel* 0.124 0.211 
Geneva* 0.127 0.318 
Berne 0.150 0.173 
Lausanne 0.164 0.316 
Lucerne 0.153 0.354 
Lugano* 0.156 0.215 
Mean 0.143 0.278 
*excluding foreign communes in cross-border metropolitan areas 
 
4.1 Metropolitan patterns of public finance 
After examining the territorial patterns of the distribution of poverty and wealth in the seven 
Swiss metropolitan areas under scrutiny, we now turn to determining the territorial patterns of 
public service provision therein. In order to do so, we must first examine the role of the different 
state levels, before examining aspects of municipal public finance.  
9  The value of these metro level Gini coefficients theoretically ranges from 0 (all municipalities have the same level of 
unemployment respectively income tax revenues) to 1 (all unemployment respectively all tax revenues concentrate in one 
single municipality). In order to eliminate the statistical effects of the unequal size of municipalities - measures of dispersion 
within a unit are influenced by the size of this unit - we use weighted Gini coefficients, i.e. the size of the population of the 
various municipalities was taken into account in the computation of the metro-level Gini coefficient.  
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Features of Swiss federalism 
Switzerland is a federalist state with three levels of government: the federation, twenty-six 
federate states - the so-called ‘cantons’ - and roughly 2600 municipalities - called ‘communes’. 
Swiss federalism can be considered as "decentralized federalism " (Braun, 2003a) due to the 
strong position of the cantons and the relative weakness of the federal government, not only in 
terms of legal competencies, but also in terms of fiscal resources and implementation power. The 
municipalities have no original powers granted to them constitutionally. The degree of municipal 
autonomy is subject to cantonal legislation, both in terms of legal competencies and fiscal 
resources. But in general, and compared to other federations, local autonomy is quite high in 
Switzerland. Indeed, decentralization and subnational autonomy have always been seen as crucial 
ingredients to national cohesion in a multi-cultural society (Linder, 2010). 
At the core of the decentralised structure of Swiss federalism is the principle of tax autonomy of 
all three state levels, deeply enshrined in the federal constitution since 1848. Not only the federal 
government, but also the cantons and the municipalities have the right to raise their own taxes on 
income and property. This principle of tax autonomy has sparked fiscal competition at the 
subnational level, which has become a characteristic feature of Swiss federalism (Braun, 2003b). 
Fiscal competition between cantons has led to the emergence of a wide range of different 
cantonal tax regimes, which differ not only with respect to overall levels of taxes, but also with 
respect to the progressivity of income tax (Gilardi et al., 2013). Additionally, there is fiscal 
competition between municipalities within cantons, and the municipal tax rates differ quite 
substantially across municipalities.  
These characteristic features of Swiss federalism are nicely reflected in the public finance figures 
shown in Table 4. The strong position of the cantons is mirrored in their share of the overall 
public expenditures (42.3%), which is considerably higher than that of the federation (33.6%) or 
of the municipalities (24.1%). On the revenue side, the cantons clearly have the lion's share 
(42.2% of overall public revenues), compared with the federation (34.5%), or the municipalities 
(28.4%). The figures on social expenditures show that the federation - accounting for 41.1% of 
the overall social expenditures - plays a leading role in income redistribution. These expenditures 
are mainly related to the nationwide systems of social security in the field of old age, invalidity, 
unemployment, as well as health. However, the cantons also engage a large share of social 
expenditures (38.8%), and the municipalities have a substantial role in redistributive policies as 
well (20.1%).  
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Table 4: Swiss fiscal federalism: selected figures of public finance 
    Federation Cantons  Municipalities Total 
Overall public 
expenditures 
in Mio. CHF 60'031 75'517 43'017 178'564 
in % 33.6 42.3 24.1 100.0 
Total transfer 
expenditures 
in Mio. CHF 37'850 34'186 12'219 84'254 
in % 44.9 40.6 14.5 100.0 
in % total exp. 63.1 45.3 28.4 47.2 
Overall public 
revenues 
in Mio. CHF 62'942 76'886 42'528 182'356 
in % 34.5 42.2 23.3 100.0 
Total transfer 
revenues 
in Mio. CHF 357 22'866 5'342 28'565 
in % 1.3 80.0 18.7 100.0 
in % total rev. 0.6 29.7 12.6 15.7 
Overall social 
expenditures 
in Mio. CHF 15'911 15'019 7'790 38'720 
in % 41.1 38.8 20.1 100.0 
in % total exp. 26.5 19.9 18.1 21.7 
Source: Federal Finance Administration (FFA), Financial Statistics 2010 
  
 
 
The figures in Table 4 also show the importance of intergovernmental grants in Swiss federalism. 
Indeed, a large proportion of cantonal revenues (29.7%) stem from transfer payments by the 
federation (vertical transfers), but also from other cantons (horizontal transfers). 
Intergovernmental grants are also an important aspect in municipal finance: transfer payments 
account for more than a quarter of municipal expenditures (28.4%), as well as for a substantial 
part of municipal revenues (12.6%). Well in line with the theory of fiscal federalism10, 
intergovernmental grants follow two distinct rationales. On the one hand, transfer payments are 
the consequence of Politikverflechtung  - or 'joint decision-making' as Fritz Scharpf (1997) calls 
it. Indeed, the practice of policy-making in Swiss federalism rests on a multitude of mechanisms 
of intergovernmental cooperation, co-decision and co-financing, not only vertically across state 
levels (see Klöti, 2000), but also horizontally between jurisdictions at the same level (see 
Bochsler, 2010) - i.e. between cantons and between municipalities. On the other hand, transfer 
payments are at the core of equalization schemes that have been set up since the middle of the 
20th century, in order to counteract horizontal fiscal imbalances at the subnational level. 
Equalization schemes exist both at the national level (horizontal equalization between cantons), 
as well as within cantons (horizontal equalization between municipalities). On the whole, 
10  Indeed, since the implementation of a major reform decided in 2004 (the so-called Neuer Finanz und Lastenausgleich), the 
workings of Swiss federalism have been strongly inspired by the theoretical model of fiscal federalism (Frey, 2005). Besides a 
redistribution of different tasks between state levels, new systems of intergovernmental cooperation and fiscal equalization 
were devised at the federal level. This federal reform has also sparked reforms of cantonal systems of intergovernmental 
grants (Frey and Frey, 2013) 
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intergovernmental cooperation and fiscal equalization are found to have kept tax competition in 
check (Frey, 2005, Gilardi et al., 2013): there is, as of yet, no evidence for a ruinous ‘race to the 
bottom’. 
This general pattern of Swiss fiscal federalism is subject to considerable variation between 
different cantons. Because municipalities are subjects of cantonal law, their rights and duties vary 
across cantons. This is evident from the figures on overall, social and transfer expenditures of 
those cantons with at least one municipality in one of the seven metropolitan areas under scrutiny 
(Table 5). First of all, comparing the share of overall expenditures from cantons to the one of 
their municipalities, it appears that in the small urban cantons of Basel-City (BS) and Geneva 
(GE) more than 80% (GE) or even 98% (BS) of all expenditures come from the canton. This is 
not surprising because Basel-City consists more or less of the city of Basle, whereas the highly 
centralized canton Geneva is strongly characterized by its central city. On the other side of the 
spectrum, we find Zurich, where the share of total expenditures between the canton and 
municipalities is close to fifty-fifty. Lucerne (LU), Aargau (AG), Solothurn (SO) and Schwyz 
(SZ) too, have a highly decentralized expenditure structure with around 40% of all expenditures 
coming from the municipalities. In the remaining six cantons, municipal expenditures make up 
for between 30% (Fribourg FR) and 35% of total expenditures. The 131 municipalities of the 
metropolitan area of Zurich are in three cantons that belong to the ones with the highest 
municipal share of total expenditures. A same picture appears regarding the smaller metropolitan 
area of Lucerne. 
Regarding social expenditures, the municipal share in total social expenditure is smallest in 
Basel-City and Geneva, together with Nidwalden (NW). In these cantons, social expenditures are 
mainly paid by the cantons. On the other side, again Zurich with high 57% and Lucerne with over 
40% have high shares of municipal social expenditures. Also Solothurn (SO) with a 40% 
municipal share of social expenditures can be seen as a canton with high municipal social 
expenditures. This indicates a high municipal autonomy in these cantons.  
Not only social expenditures by municipalities, but also transfer expenditures are highest in the 
canton of Zurich. 47% of all transfer revenues in the canton Zurich come from the municipalities. 
Taken together, the share of total as well as social and transfer expenditures between the canton 
and its municipalities is clearly highest in Zurich. On the other side, the cantons Basel-City and 
Geneva have large shares of expenditures paid by the cantonal level, indicating a rather low 
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financial autonomy of the municipalities. As is the case on the federal level, transfer payments 
between municipalities within cantons are related to intergovernmental cooperation as well as to 
schemes of fiscal equalization between municipalities. The extent to which these equalization 
schemes redistribute fiscal resources from rich to poor municipalities varies considerably across 
cantons. Thankfully and for the first time ever, these variations between cantonal equalization 
schemes have been systematically assessed and quantified in a recent study aptly entitled The 
maze of fiscal equalization (Avenir Suisse, 2013). On the basis of the figures for municipal fiscal 
revenues and transfer payments, the percentage of municipal fiscal resources that are 
redistributed between the municipalities was calculated for each canton (Avenir Suisse, 2013: 
101 ff.). This number is a good measure of the extent to which rich municipalities within one 
canton transfer fiscal resources to poorer ones. A look at the intermunicipal equalization 
percentages for the different cantons shows considerable differences (Table 5). In the canton of 
Vaud (VD - where the Lausanne metropolitan area as well as parts of the Geneva metropolitan 
area are located), nearly half of municipal fiscal revenues are used for intermunicipal 
redistribution. Vaud is a clear outlier, followed, at some distance, by Zurich (ZH), Nidwald (NW) 
and Baselland (BL) where still nearly a third (ZH) to a quarter (NW, BL) of municipal fiscal 
revenues is used for intermunicipal equalization. In all the other cantons, the percentage of 
intermunicipal equalization is much lower.  
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 Table 5: Public expenditures of cantons and municipalities in the seven major metropolitan areas (in 2010), as well as percentage of intermunicipal fiscal 
equalization (2011-13) 
Metropo-
litan area 
Total 
munici-
palities 
Cantons 
w. 
munici-
palities 
total expenditures social expenditures transfer expenditures Intermunicipal 
canton communes* canton communes* canton communes* equalization 
Mio. 
CHF in % 
Mio. 
CHF in % 
Mio. 
CHF in % 
Mio. 
CHF in % 
Mio. 
CHF in % 
Mio. 
CHF in % 
percentage 
in cantons 
Zurich 131 ZH: 104 11'536 50.5 11'308 49.5 1'902 42.6 2'560 57.4 4'730 52.6 4'258 47.4 30 
AG: 24 4'166 60.1 2'765 39.9 701 64.1 393 35.9 2'016 72.7 756 27.3 15 
SZ: 3 1'095 61.4 688 38.6 159 62.8 94 37.2 676 83.2 136 16.8 17.5 
Basle 74 BS: 3 4'293 98.0 87 2.0 797 97.7 19 2.3 1'547 97.7 36 2.3 n.a. 
BL: 52 2'421 69.8 1'048 30.2 458 70.9 188 29.1 1'313 85.9 216 14.1 25 
SO: 11 1'894 60.8 1'223 39.2 393 60.0 262 40.0 1'117 78.5 306 21.5 15 
AG: 8 4'166 60.1 2'765 39.9 701 64.1 393 35.9 2'016 72.7 756 27.3 5 
Geneva 74 GE: 42 8'430 81.3 1'940 18.7 1'743 86.0 284 14.0 3'676 89.4 435 10.6 25 
VD: 32 7'708 67.4 3'737 32.6 1'761 67.5 847 32.5 4'110 79.4 1'065 20.6 47.5 
Berne 42 BE: 39 10'129 68.1 4'740 31.9 2'158 63.4 1'243 36.6 4'744 72.7 1'781 27.3 25 
FR: 3 2'943 70.0 1'260 30.0 518 76.9 156 23.1 1'298 73.5 469 26.5 7.5 
Lausanne 69 VD: 69 7'708 67.4 3'737 32.6 1'761 67.5 847 32.5 4'110 79.4 1'065 20.6 47.5 
Lucerne 16 LU: 14 3'058 60.0 2'043 40.0 605 59.4 413 40.6 1'764 74.5 603 25.5 15 
NW: 1 331 67.1 162 32.9 51 90.0 6 10.0 169 92.4 14 7.6 30 
SZ: 1 1'095 61.4 688 38.6 159 62.8 94 37.2 676 83.2 136 16.8 17.5 
Lugano 50 TI: 50 3'209 65.5 1'693 34.5 852 78.1 239 21.9 1'482 79.1 390 20.9 22.5 
 
Sources of expenditure data: Federal Finance Administration FFA, Financial Statistics 2010, source for equalization index: Avenir Suisse (2013) 
* sum of all communes within a canton, including commues outside the metropolitan areas 
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Municipal public finance in the seven metropolitan areas 
Table 6 provides an overview of municipal finance in the seven metropolitan areas under 
scrutiny. It clearly shows that there are substantial differences across municipalities within 
metropolitan areas. In all seven metropolitan areas except Geneva (and Basle, where such data is 
not available), revenues and expenditures per capita are highest in the core cities. Periurban 
suburbs have the lowest per capita expenditures in all metropolitan areas except in Geneva. As 
we have seen previously, affluent suburbs are those where wealthy taxpayers live. Indeed,  per 
capita municipal revenues and expenditures are higher in affluent suburbs than in the other types 
of suburbs - but generally not as high as in the core cities. The municipal tax rate index also 
shows that, in all seven metropolitan areas, affluent suburbs have the lowest municipal tax rate. 
This means that taxpayers there are taxed a smaller proportion of their income than anywhere 
else.  
Second, there are also substantial differences between overall levels of per capita municipal 
revenues and expenditures across the seven metropolitan areas. Most significant are the 
differences in per capita social expenditures: they range from an average of 562 CHF in Basle to 
1’297 CHF in Lausanne. This does not necessarily mean, however, that residents of the Lausanne 
metropolitan area are treated more generously than those in Basel. As we have seen previously 
(see Table 5), the share of the municipalities in social expenditures varies substantially across 
cantons and it might well be that low municipal expenditures are compensated by a higher 
expenditure levels of the canton. In order to account for these cross-cantonal differences, we have 
calculated the per capita of overall social expenditures, by adding the presumed cantonal social 
expenditures per capita in a municipality.11 The new figure displays considerably smaller 
differences between levels of social expenditures in metropolitan municipalities. Nevertheless, 
some differences remain, both between and within metropolitan areas. Levels of social 
expenditures are particularly low in the municipalities of the Basel and the Zurich metropolitan 
areas. With respect to municipal types, social expenditures are generally highest in the core cities, 
still quite high in affluent suburbs, but lower in inner and periurban suburbs. Lausanne is an 
exception in the sense that affluent suburbs there show higher levels of social expenditures than 
the core city.  
11  This is an extrapolation from the municipal social expenditures per capita, which was obtained by  multiplying the per capita 
social expenditures of a municipality with the ratio between the cantonal and the municipal share in the overall social 
expenditures (see Table 5) .  
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The average share of votes for the left parties in two recent national elections in Table 6 gives an 
idea of the political preferences of the electorate in the metropolitan municipalities under 
scrutiny. The cumulated percentage of votes for parties considered as representing the left (i.e. 
the Social Democrats [SPS], the Greens [GP], the Christian Socialists Party [CSP], the Worker’s 
Party [PdA], as well as SolidaritéS [Sol]) is clearly highest in the core cities, except for Lugano, 
where it is higher still in the periurban suburbs. On the other side of the spectrum, affluent 
suburbs are generally those metropolitan municipalities.  
What role do transfer payments play in public finance of metropolitan municipalities? To answer 
this question, we calculated municipal revenues and expenditures without transfer payments and 
then compared these figures with the overall municipal revenues and expenditures (Table 7). The 
pattern that appears is quite straightforward. On the one hand, core cities must be distinguished 
from suburban municipalities. Compared with the suburbs in their metropolitan areas, the core 
cities have rather low shares of transfer revenues and expenditures. They do not pay large 
amounts of transfers to other jurisdictions, but also receive small transfers from other 
municipalities. Transfer payments are clearly more important in the suburban municipalities. If 
we look at suburban municipalities, on the other hand, affluent suburbs turn out to be those 
suburbs that generally have the highest share of transfer expenditures, while the share of transfer 
revenues is rather low. Compared with the other suburbs, they contribute more to transfer 
systems, but receive less. The reverse is true for inner suburbs and periurban suburbs: the share of 
transfer revenues is higher and the share of transfer expenditures is lower.  
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Table 6: Municipal finance in the seven major metropolitan areas, means for municipal types (in 2010) 
Metro. 
area
Type of 
municipality
Municipal 
revenues 
(CHF p.c.)1
Municipal 
expenditures 
(CHF p.c.)1
Municipal 
tax rate 
index2
Municipal 
social 
expenditures 
(CHF p.c.)
Overall social 
expenditures in 
municipality 
(CHF p.c. )3 
Left parties 
(% of votes)4
Core cities 20'897 20'978 109.6 3'757 6'549 42.9
Inner sub. 5'425 4'966 97.1 1'438 2'591 23.5
Affluent sub. 8'699 8'404 77.3 1'189 2'105 19.2
Periurban sub. 4'456 4'064 96.8 647 1'265 22.2
Overall 5'572 5'167 94.4 1'089 1'998 22.6
Core cities n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a. 47.6
Inner sub. 4'193 3'152 97.3 764 2'433 37.2
Affluent sub. 4'632 3'620 77.4 511 1'760 36.4
Periurban sub. 4'041 2'701 100.6 447 1'375 32.4
Overall 4'128 2'912 98.1 562 1'769 34.5
Core cities 5'799 5'104 107.4 763 5'454 47.3
Inner sub. 3'975 3'286 102.6 608 3'376 38.0
Affluent sub. 6'165 5'228 86.0 1'258 4'497 28.4
Periurban sub. 5'552 4'700 95.4 1'317 4'266 32.4
Overall 5'399 4'557 93.6 1'103 4'147 32.4
Core cities 9'257 8'368 90.9 2'390 6'538 52.5
Inner sub. 4'869 4'178 86.6 1'448 3'962 30.2
Affluent sub. 5'245 4'979 58.4 1'640 4'486 30.1
Periurban sub. 3'942 3'170 92.2 831 2'274 28.4
Overall 4'492 3'763 89.0 1'145 3'133 29.7
Core cities 13'232 12'287 112.6 1'342 4'132 56.6
Inner sub. 5'576 5'003 95.7 1'245 3'831 42.0
Affluent sub. 8'452 7'735 81.2 2'069 6'368 35.1
Periurban sub. 5'347 4'649 96.9 1'117 3'440 37.0
Overall 5'971 5'319 94.6 1'297 3'993 38.9
Core cities 8'580 7'549 87.2 1'564 3'855 39.8
Inner sub. 5'597 4'318 92.5 1'197 2'949 21.7
Affluent sub. 7'136 5'874 57.3 829 2'042 15.2
Periurban sub. 4'488 2'845 91.6 794 1'956 19.8
Overall 5'603 4'239 89.4 1'082 2'665 21.6
Core cities 7'336 6'535 78.8 2'015 9'192 23.8
Inner sub. 5'228 4'320 85.0 1'003 4'575 21.5
Affluent sub. 5'268 4'383 78.8 887 4'046 22.8
Periurban sub. 3'849 3'074 96.0 627 2'860 27.8
Overall 4'686 3'840 88.7 846 3'858 24.3
Core cities 10'850 10'137 97.8 1'972 5'953 44.3
Inner sub. 5'038 4'336 94.9 1'155 3'224 30.2
Affluent sub. 6'886 6'141 81.2 1'253 3'875 26.5
Periurban sub. 4'505 3'698 96.8 774 2'264 29.2
Overall 5'170 4'415 93.6 1'013 2'939 29.4
*excluding foreign communes in cross-border metropolitan areas
1 without function education
2 The Municipal tax rate index is calculated on the basis of the average rate of municipal income tax within a ginv canton (=100)
3 Calculated on the basis of the ratio between the shares of the cantons and their municipalities in overall social expenditures (see Table 5)
4 Average share of left parties in parliamentary elections 2007 and 2011
Sources: cantonal financial and statistical offices, Federal Tax Administration, Federal Statistical Office
Lugano*
Overall
Zürich
Basle*
Geneva*
Berne
Lausanne
Lucerne
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Table 7: Municipal transfers in the seven major metropolitan areas, means for types of municipalites (in 2010) 
Metropolitan 
area
Type of 
municipality N
Revenues per capita 
(in CHF) without 
transfers
Expendiures per capita 
(in CHF) without 
transfers
Transfer revenues 
(% of total 
revenues)
Transfer 
expenditures (% of 
total expenditures)
Core cities 1 21'014 22'515 1.0 4.6
Inner sub. 56 5'097 4'753 8.2 20.2
Affluent sub. 17 8'577 5'776 3.2 34.0
Periurban sub. 54 3'967 3'505 12.2 26.9
Overall 128 5'207 4'501 9.2 24.8
Core cities n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Inner sub. 25 4'010 3'090 11.9 31.4
Affluent sub. 4 4'707 3'233 4.7 34.6
Periurban sub. 42 3'891 2'851 9.2 31.4
Overall 71 3'979 2'957 9.9 31.6
Core cities 1 5'640 5'034 3.1 6.6
Inner sub. 19 3'764 3'488 5.1 19.7
Affluent sub. 30 5'805 4'694 4.1 34.6
Periurban sub. 24 5'062 5'155 7.5 40.8
Overall 74 5'038 4'538 5.5 32.4
Core cities 1 7'332 6'101 23.2 35.2
Inner sub. 16 4'140 2'645 14.5 46.0
Affluent sub. 1 4'352 2'330 15.4 58.2
Periurban sub. 21 3'735 2'257 6.8 44.6
Overall 39 4'010 2'516 10.6 45.2
Core cities 1 11'969 23'451 11.8 12.9
Inner sub. 26 4'886 6'364 13.8 44.1
Affluent sub. 8 7'201 8'374 14.2 49.9
Periurban sub. 27 4'681 5'972 13.5 44.9
Overall 62 5'210 6'728 13.7 44.7
Core cities 1 8'536 6'769 5.9 25.4
Inner sub. 8 5'601 4'435 10.4 29.8
Affluent sub. 1 7'138 6'049 4.9 19.4
Periurban sub. 4 4'429 2'909 13.8 43.7
Overall 14 5'586 4'281 10.7 32.7
Core cities 1 6'971 5'213 7.2 29.6
Inner sub. 20 5'145 3'085 5.9 36.4
Affluent sub. 7 5'277 3'299 3.0 36.8
Periurban sub. 21 3'766 2'413 9.0 36.9
Overall 49 4'610 2'871 6.8 36.5
Core cities 6 10'244 11'514 8.7 19.0
Inner sub. 170 4'695 4'204 9.7 30.2
Affluent sub. 68 6'541 5'153 5.2 36.6
Periurban sub. 193 4'149 3'646 10.2 35.5
Overall 437 4'817 4'206 9.2 33.4
Sources: cantonale financial and statistical offices
Lugano*
Overall
Zürich
Basle*
Geneva*
Berne
Lausanne
Lucerne
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4.3 Explaining social expenditures in metropolitan municipalities 
Referring to the debate over the SSGI thesis recounted in the theory section above, the core 
questions to answer with respect to public finance in metropolitan municipalities are (a) whether 
there is a systematic mismatch between fiscal resources and social needs across metropolitan 
localities, and (b) to what extent intergovernmental grants resulting from intergovernmental 
cooperation or fiscal equalization is able to reduce this mismatch. In order to explore these 
questions, we have formulated three hypotheses - the ‘public finance hypothesis’, the ‘social 
needs hypothesis’ and the ‘political preferences hypothesis’ - that will now be tested in 
multivariate regression analysis.  
Four different regression models models were estimated (Table 8). Given the clear differences 
between core cities and suburbs pointed out in the bivariate results, a dummy variable for core 
cities was included in order to control for the differences between core cities and suburbs.  
Model 1 explores the ‘public finance hypothesis’. It includes independent variables which we can 
assume to measure the financial situation and fiscal profile of a municipality. The results clearly 
indicate that the overall level of social expenditures in a municipality is influenced by 
characteristics of municipal public finance. It is positively associated with municipal revenues 
(the higher the public revenues of a municipality, the higher social expenditures therein), and 
negatively associated with municipal tax effort (the lower the tax rate, the higher the level of 
social expenditures). The share of municipal revenues stemming from transfer payments also 
plays a role: the more significant transfer payments are in a municipality’s budget, the higher the 
level of social expenditures.  
The second regression model explores the ‘social needs hypothesis’. It estimates the effects of 
socio-demographic characteristics which we assume to measure the extent of social needs in a 
municipality: the proportion of immigrants, the proportion of economically dependent residents 
(aged under 18 or above 65), the unemployment rate, as well as the median taxable income. The 
results show that social needs apparently do play a role in explaining the level of social 
expenditures in a municipality: the higher the proportions of immigrants and economically 
dependent residents, the higher social expenditures in a municipality. The unemployment rate is 
not significantly associated with social expenditures. This might have to do with the fact that the 
unemployment insurance is a federal institution in Switzerland, and expenditures for 
unemployment benefits are not incurred by cantons or municipalities. The level of resident 
wealth (measured by the median taxable income) is not significantly associated with the level of 
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social expenditures. Interestingly, a comparison at the explained variance shows that the ‘social 
needs’ model has less explanatory power (adj. r2=23.7%) than the ‘public finance’ model (adj. 
r2=31.7%).  
Table 8: Determinants of overall per capita social expenditures in municipalities of Swiss metropolitan areas 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 2898.4
*** -3609.7** 2155.8*** -1182.7 
 
(-712.8) (-1089.7) (-346) (-1231.1) 
Core city (dummy) 722.7 2302.0
** 2689.4** -90.92 
 
(-737.2) (-751.3) (-842.4) (-686.3) 
Municipal revenues excluding transfers 0.450
***   0.382*** 
  (per capita, 2010) (-0.041)   (-0.0381) 
Municipal tax rate (index, 2010) -28.02
***   -32.87*** 
 
(-6.694)   (-6.37) 
Municipal revenues from transfers  52.70
***   57.23*** 
  (percent of overall municipal revenues, 2010) (-11.08)   (-10.13) 
Foreign population (in percent, 2010)  87.93
***  70.98*** 
 
 (-8.853)  (-7.787) 
Dependents (in percent, 2010)  109.1
**  85.80** 
 
 (-33.7)  (-29.66) 
Unemployment (percent seekig job , 2010)   -0.765  -1.069 
 
 (-1.811)  (-1.547) 
Taxable income (median, 2006)  0.0156  -0.00608 
 
 (-0.0085)  (-0.00763) 
Votes for left parties   25.29
* 27.38** 
     (mean of share in 2007 and 2011 national elections)   (-11.33) (-9.268) 
Adjusted R2 0.317 0.237 0.036 0.45 
Number of observations 437 437 437 437 
Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients   
Standard errors in partentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
 
The third model explores the ‘political preference hypothesis’, gauging the effect of the 
municipal electorate's political preferences on the level of social expenditures therein. It suggests 
that such a relationship exists: the higher the percentage of votes for left parties - whom we know 
to be more favourable to redistribution of income and expansive social policies - the higher the 
level of social expenditures. However, this clearly is the model with the least explanatory power 
(adj. r2= 3.6%).  
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Finally, the fourth model combines the three previous ones. The results show that the effects of 
the predictors identified in the previous models remain significant. The level of social 
expenditures in a metropolitan municipality is not only influenced by aspects of public finance, 
but also by social needs and political preferences. Whether public resources are invested in social 
policies mostly depends on the ability of a municipality to actually generate the revenues 
necessary to afford social policies - be that because they can extract resources from a good tax 
base or because they benefit from transfer payments by other jurisdictions. Social needs seem less 
important to explain municipal engagement in redistributive policies, as do political preferences. 
This indicates that, in Swiss metropolitan areas, public resources indeed seem to be allocated to 
places where there is a certain need, but that these needs are covered in a more comprehensive 
way in municipalities that are already affluent. The importance of the political factor also 
indicates that political choices at the municipal level play a crucial role: rich municipalities with 
weak left parties will be less likely to invest in social policies.  
A closer look into the effects of the predictors from the combined model shows that metropolitan 
geopolitical fragmentation plays a role in this respect (Figure 2). The steeper slope in the left-
hand side graph suggests that the relationship between social needs (measured by the percentage 
of dependent persons) and the level of social expenditures (predicted value) in a municipality is 
stronger in metropolitan areas where institutional fragmentation is low - compared to the more 
fragmented metropolitan areas, where this relationship is weaker (right-hand side graph).12 This 
suggests that high institutional fragmentation in Swiss metropolitan areas is associated to a 
mismatch between needs and resources. The more fragmented a metropolitan area, the less the 
allocation of policy resources in a municipality is associated with the extent of social needs 
within it.  
Intergovernmental grants - epitomized by transfer payments - within cantons play an important 
role for the redistribution of resources from rich to poor municipalities. As we have seen, the 
extent to which systems of intermunicipal fiscal equalization redistribute fiscal resources varies 
strongly across cantons. This aspect notably seems to have a strong effect on the relationship 
between political preferences in municipalities for the level of social expenditures therein (Figure 
3). Where the extent of intermunicipal equalization is low to middle (the two top graphs), the  
12  The distinction between more and less fragmented metropolitan areas is based on a classification around the median of the 
geopolitical fragmentation index (see Table 1) ( median = 4.0). More precisely, the metropolitan areas of Zurich, Bern, 
Lucerne and Geneva were classified as ‘low fragmentation’'. The metropolitan areas of Basel, Lausanne and Lugano were 
classified as high fragmenttion'.  
31 
                                                 
Figure 2: The fragmentation effect: per capita social expenditures in municipalities as functions of social 
needs (percentage of dependent persons) as well as metropolitan institutional fragmentation 
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Figure 3: The intergovenrmentalism effect: per capita social expenditures in municipalities as functions of left 
vote, distinguishing between municipalities located in cantons with low, middle and high shares of 
intermunicipal redistribution 
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share of votes of left parties in a municipality is positively associated with the level of social 
expenditures in a municipality (predicted value), whereas this is not the case in cantons where the 
extent of intermunicipal redistribution is high (bottom graph). 13 It is obvious that systems of 
extensive intermunicipal redistribution de-couple the policy output at the municipal level from 
the political preferences of the municipal electorate. 
5. Discussion  
The general features of the Swiss case suggest that metropolitan areas in Switzerland are indeed a 
good empirical example to investigate the SSGI thesis, and particularly the aspects related to the 
intergovernmental and multi-level character of the metropolitan governance compound. In terms 
of the institutional setting, Swiss metropolitan areas are highly fragmented into large numbers of 
relatively small jurisdictions - and in that aspect very much resemble the US metropolitan areas 
on which most of the SSGI research has been conducted to date. In terms of governance, 
municipal autonomy is comparatively high in Swiss federalism and allows substantial discretion 
in local choices. This is also similar to the US case. But, to the difference of the US, Swiss 
federalism entails intergovernmental cooperation and equalization, not only vertically between 
cantons and municipalities, but also horizontally between municipalities. The characteristics of 
these mechanisms vary across cantons and thereby make the Swiss metropolitan areas 
particularly appealing cases for the study of the effect of intergovernmentalism on redistributive 
policies in metropolitan areas.  
With respect to residential sorting, we do see that there are territorial patterns of social 
segregation according to social status and lifestyle, distinguishing between core cities, inner 
suburbs, periurban suburbs and affluent suburbs. The SSGI proposition P1 can thus be 
confirmed: households with similar status or lifestyle tend to seek residence near one another. 
However, the homogeneity of these municipalities varies. Poor municipalities tend to be more 
homogenous. Affluent municipalities are actually only affluent in average, due to the presence of 
a small number of very rich residents. For the Swiss case, proposition P3 of the SSGI thesis is 
thus not entirely supported: while social segregation in Swiss metropolitan areas has led to the 
13  The qualification of intermunicipal redistribution systems in cantons is based on the percentage of  municipal fiscal resources 
that are used for intermunicipal redistribution as calculated in (Avenir Suisse, 2013). The threefold categorisation 
distinguishes between municipalities located in the canton of Vaud (high percentage of intermunicipal redistribution), those 
located in the cantons of Zurich, Bern, Baselland, Nidwald and Geneva (middle percentage of intermunicipal redistribution) 
as well as those located in the cantons of Lucerne, Schwyz,  Fribourg, Solothurn, Argovia and Ticino (low percentage of 
intermunicipal redistribution).  
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emergence of relatively homogenous poor suburbs, we do not see similarly homogenous wealthy 
places.  
Nevertheless, our analysis of the relationship between socio-demographic and financial data 
clearly shows that social segregation across municipalities in Swiss metropolitan areas is 
paralleled by a segregation of the tax base, and also affects service levels across municipalities. 
Even though the transfer systems have a moderating effect, at the end of the day suburbs with 
wealthy taxpayers have higher revenues, and also spend more on public services than suburbs 
whose taxpayers are not so wealthy. These results thus clearly support the SSGI proposition P5 in 
the Swiss case: the higher the social status of a municipality, the larger the resources available, 
and the more this municipality spends to support public services - also in the field of social 
policy, as we have seen - while it is still able to impose a lower tax charge on their residents. Our 
analysis of the relationship between social expenditures and political variables supports the idea 
that this stems from a deliberate choice: the wealthy municipalities have an electorate that leans 
towards the right and is therefore interested in keeping taxes low. A more left leaning municipal 
electorate, however, is more likely to set a higher tax rate and to increase social expenditures. 
These observations provide empirical support for proposition P2: municipalities provide the 
political context by which residents shape the municipal tax-service package according to their 
political preferences.  
Our analysis also presents an answer to proposition P7, i.e. that core cities tend to allocate 
services in favour of the poor. Indeed, cities were found to have higher levels of social 
expenditures. This can be explained not only by the fact that core cities also benefit from higher 
levels of public revenue - mainly due to revenues from tax on businesses located primarily in the 
core cities. The political aspect is equally important: core city electorates lean more to the left and 
therefore are more likely to favour governmental spending on social policies. Of course, we do 
not know whether this spending necessarily translates into higher levels of services - for the time 
being, we have to assume that service efficiency is constant across jurisdictions. Hence, 
proposition P6 (spending levels are related to service levels in a linear way) could not be tested 
empirically.  
Our analysis provides support for some core arguments put forward by the SSGI thesis quite, but 
also allows some important qualifications. On the one hand, we could show that in the 
governmentally fragmented Swiss metropolitan areas, social policies are not only shaped by the 
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extent of social needs, but also and even more strongly by the availability of public revenues 
(which is strongly conditioned by the municipal tax base), as well as political preferences. In the 
fragmented institutional setting of the Swiss metropolis, social policies appear as an act of 
voluntarism by the rich, rather than a matter of redistribution oriented by principles of social 
justice. This conclusion is also warranted when we look at variations across the seven 
metropolitan areas within Switzerland: the relationship between needs and expenditures is 
stronger in less fragmented settings.  
On the other hand, however, our analysis suggests that qualifications to the SSGI thesis are 
needed with respect to the effects of the intergovernmental nexus found in Swiss metropolitan 
settings. Intergovernmental grants play a crucial role in metropolitan public finance in 
Switzerland. Intergovernmental cooperation, as well as fiscal equalization is widespread and 
results in a redistribution of fiscal resources between rich and poor municipalities. 
Intergovernmentalism is obvoiously able to moderate the mismatch between social needs and 
social expenditures in the fragmented Swiss metropolitan settings. This finding strongly supports 
Elinor Ostrom's contention that the multi-level intergovernmental compound of polycentric 
metropolitan governance is indeed able to attenuate the SSGI problem.  
Our results thus also support some arguments made by fiscal federalists. Intergovernmental 
grants indeed appear as appropriate to compensate the equity-related drawbacks of 
interjurisdictional fiscal competition. However, our results undermine one point in the fiscal 
fedarlist model. Especially in more recent work - the “second generation theory of fiscal 
federalism” as Oates has called it (Oates, 2005) - fiscal federalists argue that decentralisation is 
per se preferable to centralisation because local autonomy automatically ensures better 
accountability, i.e. sensitivity of outcomes to preferences. While fiscal federalists generally 
acknowledge the trade-off between superior policy coordination under centralisation and local 
accountability under decentralisation, our findings suggest the existence of an additional trade-
off. Indeed, intergovernmental grants can also limit local accountability: the relationship between 
municipal political preferences and policy outcomes was weaker in a context of extensive 
intermunicipal fiscal equalization. However, given limitations of the data in this study, these 
findings can only be tentative for the time being. Hence, further research is needed to fully 
understand the workings of the multi-level compound of metropolitan governance and its effects 
on the shaping of social policies in the metropolitan areas.   
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7. Methodological Appendix 
The analyses presented in this chapter draw on municipal level data about socio-demographic 
composition, spatial context and public finances in the year 2010, in the seven largest 
metropolitan areas in Switzerland – i.e. over or near 200’000 inhabitants (see Table 1). Most data 
was provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, the Swiss Federal Tax Administration, the 
Federal Finance Administration (FFA), and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). 
Data on local public finance in the seven metropolitan areas under scrutiny was provided by the 
cantonal statistical offices and the finance administrations of the cantons of Aargau, Zurich, 
Geneva, Vaud, Basel-Landschaft, Solothurn, Berne, Lucerne and Ticino. No financial data could 
be collected from the cantons of Schwyz, Basel-City, Fribourg and Nidwalden. The following 
table presents the operationalization of the variables used throughout the analysis.  
Table 9: Operational description of variables used 
Variable name definition missing values 
  commune-level variables   
Population 2010 Municipal population at  31.12. 2010 0/456 
Foreign born 2010 (%) Foreign born / population size *100 0/456 
Unemployment 2010 (%) Registered unemployed / Total population between 18 and 65 
years old *100 
8/456 
Federal direct tax per capita (2008) Total federal tax perceived in municipality / population size 0/456 
New housing 2010 proportion of dwelling houses built during the last 20 years (without 
renovations) 
0/456 
Type of communes 2010 Typology of communes, 4 Types 0/456 
Vote for left parties 2007 and 2011 
 
Cumulative percentage of votes for the Social Democratic Party, 
the Green Party, the Christian Socialist Party, Workers' Party, as 
well as Solidarités in the 2011 national election 
0/456 
Municipal Gini-coefficient 2006 Municipal Gini-coefficients taxable income, Federal income tax 
2006 
1/456 
Municipal mean income 2006 Municipal mean taxable income, Federal income tax 2006 1/456 
Municipal median income 2006 Municipal median taxable income, Federal income tax 2006 1/456 
   Local public finance data of metropolitan areas  
Total revenue per capita (2010) total local revenue / population size  19/456 
Total expenditure per capita (2010) total local expenditure / population size  19/456 
Transfer revenues 2010 share of transfer payments revenue relative to total local revenue 19/456 
Transfer expenditures 2010 share of transfer payments expenditure relative to total local 
expenditure 
19/456 
Social expenditures Expenditures of the official functional category " social welfare"  19/456 
Tax rate index 2010 index: 100*(tij/mean(tj)), 
where: 
t: tax rate 
i: commune subscript 
j: canton subscript 
19/456 
   MA-level variables   
Gini coefficient ( )( )∑
−
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where: 
G: Gini coefficient 
X: cumulative percentage of population 
Y: cumulative percentage of either total expenditures, total 
revenues or redistributive expenditure per capita 
Unemployment: 
0/7 
Finances: 
0/7 
Metropolitan population population size of metropolitan area 0/7 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) number of communes per 10,000 inhabitants divided by the central 
city’s share of the overall metropolitan population in percent 
0/7 
   Cantonal level variables   
Overall cantonal public expenditures 2010 Total public expenditures by canton 2010 0/13 
Overall municipal public expenditures 2010 Total public expenditures by municipalities, aggregated on cantonal 
level 2010 
0/13 
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Variable name definition missing values 
Overall cantonal social expenditures 2010 Total social expenditures by canton 2010 0/13 
Overall municipal social expenditures 2010 Total social expenditures by municipalities, aggregated on cantonal 
level 2010 
0/13 
Total cantonal transfer expenditures 2010 Total transfer expenditures by canton 2010 0/13 
Total municipal transfer expenditures 2010 Total transfer expenditures by municipalities, aggregated on 
cantonal level 2010 
0/13 
Percentage of intermunicipal redistribution share of absolute redistribution relative to aggregated municipal tax 
revenues 
0/13 
Sources: 
- mean income federal income tax, Gini coefficients on communal level (taxable income 2006), mean and median taxable income: Swiss Federal Tax Administration 
- local public finance data: statistical offices and finance administrations of cantons  
- Unemployed 2010: State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO 
- Financial statistics 2010: Federal Finance Administration 
- Percentage of intermunicipal redistribution  according to Avenir Suisse(2013) 
- all other data: Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
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